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Introduction: People with psychosis show impairments in cognitive flexibility, a
phenomenon that is still poorly understood. In this study, we tested if there were
differences in cognitive and metacognitive processes related to rigidity in patients with
psychosis. We compared individuals with dichotomous interpersonal thinking and those
with flexible interpersonal thinking.
Methods: We performed a secondary analysis using two groups with psychosis,
one with low levels of dichotomous interpersonal thinking (n = 42) and the other
with high levels of dichotomous interpersonal thinking (n = 43). The patients were
classified by splitting interpersonal dichotomous thinking (measured using the repertory
grid technique) to the median. The groups were administered a sociodemographic
questionnaire, a semi-structured interview to assess psychotic symptoms [Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS)], a self-report of cognitive insight [Beck Cognitive
Insight Scale (BCIS)], neurocognitive tasks [Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)], and the repertory grid technique. We used a
logistic regression model to test which factors best differentiate the two groups.
Results: The group with high dichotomous interpersonal thinking had earlier age at
onset of the psychotic disorder, higher self-certainty, impaired executive functioning,
affected abstract thinking, and lower estimated cognitive reserve than the group with
flexible thinking. According to the logistic regression model, estimated cognitive reserve
and self-certainty were the variables that better differentiated between the two groups.
Conclusion: Cognitive rigidity may be a generalized bias that affects not only
neurocognitive and metacognitive processes but also the sense of self and significant
others. Patients with more dichotomous interpersonal thinking might benefit from
interventions that target this cognitive bias on an integrative way and that is adapted
to their general level of cognitive abilities.
Keywords: self, schizophrenia, repertory grid, personal construct psychology, dichotomous thinking,
cognitive bias
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INTRODUCTION
People with psychosis exhibit impairments in cognitive flexibility
(1, 2), a phenomenon considered a fundamental aspect of
health with a major contribution on daily well-being. Cognitive
flexibility refers to several dynamic processes that unfold over
time and is reflected in how a person adapts to fluctuating
situational demands, reconfigures mental resources, or shifts
perspective (3). In psychosis, cognitive flexibility has been defined
from two main approaches and using a variety of metacognitive
and neurocognitive measures. As a metacognitive process, it
is a complex higher order reasoning construct. It includes an
individual’s ability to release from a strongly held belief, once
formed, in order to engage in further cognitive operations
involved in making judgments under conditions of uncertainty:
rethinking the possibility of being mistaken; reviewing the main
belief in light of newer evidence/information; and generating
and considering other explanations (4). In contrast, as a
neurocognitive process, it is considered a component of executive
functioning. In this sense, cognitive flexibility refers to the
ability to switch thought and/or response patterns and target-
directed behaviors. Further, cognitive flexibility is critical in using
feedback to modify cognitive sets. Essentially, in the context of
neurocognition, the paradigm has referred to the inability to
set-shifting, also called “stuck-in-set behavior” (1).
From the metacognitive approach, impairments in cognitive
flexibility in psychosis, also termed in the literature as belief
inflexibility, have been mainly discussed in the context of
reasoning about clinical delusions (4–6). People with psychosis
exhibit impaired cognitive flexibility when reflecting about their
delusional beliefs. One form of this cognitive rigidity is the
construct of self-certainty (7), which suggests that the individual
is excessively convinced of the accuracy of their own beliefs
and is resistant to change their ideas. Individuals with psychosis
are often overconfident in errors that maintain delusional
beliefs, thus resulting in difficulties appreciating that one may
be mistaken and refusing alternative explanations (2, 8). This
reasoning process is altered in psychosis as compared with
non-psychiatric controls (9) and is a predictor of treatment
response (10).
From the neurocognitive approach, the relative inability to
shift attentional set became the paradigm case of a cognitive
consequence of frontal lobe alterations, based on the results of
early studies using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST)
(1, 11, 12). Cognitive rigidity in psychosis has been largely
studied using the WCST. Patients make more perseverative
errors and complete a smaller number of categories than healthy
controls (11). However, this pattern of results is not specific
to psychotic disorders (13), and impairments in performing
this task may strongly rely on general intellectual abilities (2).
Waltz suggests that excessive cognitive rigidity is likely to be
characteristic of subgroups of patients with specific disorder
profiles (3, 12). This idea is supported by empirical studies that
have detected subgroups of patients with different performance
on the WCST (14–16). For instance, patients with a general and
marked executive functioning impairment showed lower IQ and
severe negative symptomatology. Accordingly, identifying the
characterization of subgroups of patients with psychosis suffering
cognitive rigidity may be of interest in current research.
Understanding the complexity of cognitive rigidity in
psychosis may benefit from a wider conceptualization, such
as the one provided by the personal construct theory (PCT).
According to PCT (17, 18), people construe the self and others
using a system of personal constructs, which form a complex and
hierarchical network. Personal constructs are bipolar dimensions
of meaning, which are constructed by the individual. People use
this system to define and interpret their self and the people who
constitute their main interpersonal world. When this system is
rigid, it can manifest as a pattern of dichotomous interpersonal
thinking. The dimension of dichotomous interpersonal thinking
(polarized thinking) when interpreting the self and significant
others reflects a thinking tendency to understand oneself and
the others in extreme or dichotomous terms (19). People with
psychosis exhibit high dichotomous interpersonal thinking as
compared with controls (20–22). This is relevant because high
levels of it have been linked tomore severity of positive symptoms
(23), tomore psychopathology in general (20), and to lower social
functioning (24).
The relationship between dichotomous interpersonal thinking
and other known processes of cognitive rigidity in metacognition
and neurocognition in psychosis should be unraveled. Cognitive
biases may intrinsically happen in the context of the construal
of self and interpersonal relationships, thus possibly being
more mobilizing and effective for outcomes in therapy (23,
25, 26). Moreover, the relationship between metacognitive and
neurocognitive processes related to flexibility is still poorly
understood and is considered an underdeveloped area of
research (2). Therefore, deeper understanding of cognitive
flexibility processes in psychosis is needed in current research
to better target this outcome in therapy. Cognitive flexibility is
a mediating factor in improving symptomatology in cognitive
and metacognitive therapies for psychosis (27, 28). While it may
also be subject to change (29–31), it is resistant to change by
antipsychotic medication (32). Clarifying the facets of cognitive
flexibility in psychosis and identifying different profiles of
impairment may aid in developing tailored cognitive therapy
programs but also to partially explain heterogeneity in psychosis.
Objective and Hypothesis
We aimed to identify differences in cognitive and metacognitive
processes in patients with psychosis. For this aim, we
compared individuals with high and low dichotomous
interpersonal thinking while controlling for symptomatic
and sociodemographic factors. This procedure allowed us to
gain a full picture of dichotomous interpersonal thinking in the
context of other dimensions of cognitive rigidity in psychosis.
We hypothesized that cognitive rigidity may be a general
and underlying cognitive bias in psychosis that involves
many cognitive processes beyond reasoning about delusions,
overconfidence on own beliefs (i.e., self-certainty), and
neurocognitive processes related to flexibility (executive
functioning) or affects the sense of self. In other words, patients
with high dichotomous interpersonal thinking may have
impairments in metacognitive and neurocognitive processes
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related to rigidity. Moreover, these variables will differentiate
two profiles of patients. This hypothesis stems from previous
literature that found associations between these cognitive
processes. For instance, an association of poor executive
functioning and global cognitive capacity with high self-certainty
has been reported (6). Also, making over-confident decisions
has been largely reported in people with schizophrenia (33–35).
Other approaches to the sense of self in psychosis have also
found that interpersonal self-concepts seem to be hampered
when neurocognitive impairments occur (36). On previous
work, we also found an association of high self-certainty with




A total of 85 outpatients with a confirmed diagnosis of a
schizophrenia spectrum or related disorder were recruited
from four participating mental health centers at Barcelona
(Spain) and its surrounding area. As inclusion criteria, patients
needed to have a diagnosis of schizophrenia, psychotic disorder
not otherwise specified, delusional disorder, schizoaffective
disorder, brief psychotic disorder, or schizophreniform disorder
[according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (Third Edition) (DSM-5)]; to be aged between 18
and 60 years; and to be clinically stable enough to do the
interviews. Patients were excluded if they had an established
diagnosis of traumatic brain injury, dementia, or intellectual
disability (premorbid IQ < 70); current substance dependence;
or were hospitalized. This research is a secondary analysis from
a study about the role of personal identity in psychosis (23). The
sample had a heterogeneous profile in terms of diagnosis (45.9%
of schizophrenia, 24.7% of schizoaffective disorder, 18.8–5% of
psychosis not otherwise specified, 4.7% of schizophreniform
disorder, 3.5% of brief psychotic disorder, and 2.4% of delusional
disorder) and disorder chronicity (69.4% of prolonged psychosis
and 30.6% of early psychosis). More details of the sample
characteristics can be consulted in the primary study (23).
The clinicians of the participating mental health centers
referred the participants that met the inclusion criteria and
verbally agreed to participate in the study. The first author
carried out all the assessments. After receipt of more exhaustive
information about the study and signing the informed consent
and after confirmation of inclusion criteria was made, a
demographic questionnaire and the repertory grid technique
(RGT) were administered in the first and second sessions, while
a third session was used for the other instruments. The study was
approved by the research ethics committee of the coordinating
center (Parc Sanitari Sant Joan de Déu).
Instruments
The Repertory Grid Technique (37–39)
Dichotomous interpersonal thinking was measured with the
RGT, a semi-structured interview derived from the PCT. The
RGT can adopt different flexible formats according to the aim of
the study. In this case, we used an idiographic and interpersonal
design, which assessed the personal meanings involved in
personal identity, operationalized in terms of personal constructs.
RGT is idiographic because personal constructs (i.e., the items
of this instrument) are elicited from the participant rather than
provided by the researcher, and it is interpersonal because these
constructs are applied to a set of elements that represent other
people who are relevant for the interviewee (parents, siblings,
relatives, partners, and friends) evaluated along with “self now,”
“ideal self,” and a “non-grata person” (someone they do not
like). The dyadic method (34, 35) was used to elicit constructs,
by comparing pairs of the mentioned elements and asking for
differences and similarities between them (e.g., “nervous–calm”).
After the elicitation procedure, participants rated each element
of their grid on a 7-point Likert-type scale according to each
construct elicited in the interview. An example of a repertory grid
from one of our participants appears in a published case study
(40). For the current study, we used the index of polarization (%
of extreme ratings, “1” and “7” scores, in the grid data matrix)
as a measure of dichotomous interpersonal thinking. This is
considered a measure of dichotomous or extreme thinking in
the interpersonal domain, a form of cognitive rigidity (19). High
scores represent extremity, with the person having a tendency
toward a dichotomous thinking style, while low scores are an
indicator of flexible thinking.
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
This scale was used to assess psychotic symptoms (41, 42). We
used Wallwork’s factor analysis to derive positive, excitative, and
cognitive symptoms (43). The positive factor included four items:
delusions, hallucinations, grandiosity, and unusual thought
content. The excitative factor contained four items: excitement,
hostility, uncooperativeness, and poor impulse control. The
cognitive factor included three items: conceptual disorganization,
difficulty in abstract thinking, and poor attention. In addition,
we analyzed separately expressive and experiential deficits as
negative symptoms subdomains following the factorial division
by Khan et al. (44). The expressive factor contained blunted affect,
poor rapport, lack of spontaneity, and motor retardation, while
the experiential factor included emotional withdrawal, passive
social withdrawal, and active social avoidance.
Metacognition
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (7, 45)
This is a self-reported scale to measure cognitive insight.
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale is composed of two
subscales: self-reflectivity and self-certainty. Both subscales
are analyzed separately.
Neurocognition
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (46)
This neuropsychological task was used in its abbreviated and
computer version to measure executive function, set-shifting,
and cognitive flexibility. We included the normative scoring
of the indexes of total number of correct categories and
perseverative errors.
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The Vocabulary and Similarities Subtests of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (47)
The vocabulary subtest was used to measure premorbid IQ, an
estimator used in research to assess cognitive reserve (48). The
similarities subtest was used to assess ability for abstract thinking.
The normative scoring was used in both cases.
Data Analyses
We computed personal identity measures of data obtained from
participants’ repertory grids using GRIDCOR v4.0 (38) and
entered these results in a database along with other measures.
We conducted the main analyses in three stages. First,
we tested the normal distribution of variables. Since the
polarization index did not adjust to a normal distribution, after
visual inspection of the distribution, we identified two distant
modes. See Figure 1 for the bimodal distribution of scores of
the polarization index. The descriptive analysis supported the
identification of two modes on this index, one identified at the
score of 11% and another one at the score of 41%. Therefore,
we decided to divide the sample according to two groups,
which were split according to the median of the distribution of
scores in this index: high-dichotomous interpersonal thinking
(polarization score over 33, meaning more than 33% of extreme
scores in their grid) and low-dichotomous interpersonal thinking
(polarization score equal or below to 33). Second, to better
characterize these two groups, we performed a descriptive and
comparative analysis using mean differences or chi-square tests
for categorical variables. Third, we built a hierarchical binary
logistic regression to detect the variables that were best able
to differentiate between high- and low-polarized patients. We
included as independent variables those that were significant
at level p < 0.05 in the bivariate analysis after demographic
variables that were significant in the bivariate comparisons. On
a second block, we added our measure of metacognition, the
index of self-certainty, based on a previous analysis of this sample
as it was already known to be associated with dichotomous
interpersonal thinking (23). On following blocks, we included the
neurocognitive measures that, based on theoretical consideration
and the magnitude of the effect sizes found in the previous
bivariate comparison, should be able to differentiate between
patients with low and high levels of dichotomous interpersonal
thinking (i.e., cognitive reserve-premorbid IQ on third block,
abilities for abstract thinking on fourth block, and executive
functioning on fifth block). On the last block, we included
symptomatology factors that reached statistical significance on
the bivariate comparisons. Effect sizes and their confidence
intervals were also calculated. All the analyses were done using
the jamovi 1.0 software (49).
RESULTS
Table 1 shows descriptive and comparative results for the
sociodemographic, clinical, and cognitive variables for the high
and low dichotomous interpersonal thinking groups. Patients
with more dichotomous interpersonal thinking had an earlier
age at onset, higher self-certainty, lower estimation of their
cognitive reserve (vocabulary subtest ofWAIS), lower abilities for
FIGURE 1 | Distribution of the scores of the polarization index (dichotomous
interpersonal thinking).
abstract thinking (similarities subtest of WAIS), poorer executive
functioning (number of categories completed and perseverative
errors in the WCST), and more severity of excitative symptoms
than patients with low levels of dichotomous interpersonal
thinking, in all cases with a moderate effect size. There were no
statistically significant differences in the other sociodemographic
and clinical factors.
Table 2 shows the hierarchical logistic regression analysis for
predicting dichotomous interpersonal thinking with the variables
that were found to associate with it. On a first analysis, we
removed from our model the perseverative errors index of
the WCST due to its high detected multicollinearity [variance
inflation factor (VIF) of 4.14 and a detected correlation of 0.818
with the categories completed index of WCST], we based this
selection on considering that the number of categories completed
seemed to be a more adequate index for measuring cognitive
flexibility (50). The other variables showed adequate levels of
collinearity (VIFs all under 1.90 once this index was removed).
In the first step, age at onset was entered, but it did not result
on a significant model. In the second step, the metacognitive
measure (self-certainty) was included, which resulted on a
significant model that accounted for 6.6% (McFadden’s R2) and
12% (Nagelkerke’s R2) of the variance. The model comparison
with respect to step 2 was also statistically significant. Finally,
the final full model was composed of age at onset, self-certainty,
and one domain of neurocognition, the estimated cognitive
reserve (model of step 3). In the introduction of other domains
of neurocognition, the similarities subtest of WAIS and of the
WCST index of categories completed in subsequent steps did
not add statistically significant contributions to the model (based
on model comparisons). The final model showed adequate fit to
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TABLE 1 | Comparison of two groups of patients with psychosis which were divided according to low and high levels of dichotomous interpersonal thinking.
Full sample









df p Cramer’s V [95% CI]
Gender (% males) 63.5 69.2 58.7 1.01 1 0.315 0.11 [0.108; 0.34]
Early psychosis 30.6 35.9 26.1 0.96 1 0.328 0.11 [0.106; 0.34]
Marital status (single) 72.9 69.2 76.1 6.43 4 0.169 0.275 [0.22; 0.49]
Secondary studies completed 45.0 41.0 47.8 7.85 5 0.164 0.304 [0.24; 0.51]
Incapacity for employment 37.6 25.6 47.8 5.78 5 0.328 0.261 [0.24; 0.47]
Diagnosis of schizophrenia 45.9 35.9 54.3 5.19 5 0.393 0.247 [0.24; 0.45]
Mean (SD); Range Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Statistical
difference (t)
df p Cohen’s d [95% CI]
Socio-demographics
Age 37.1 (9.57); 19–57 37.67 (8.83) 36.54 (10.22) 0.537 83 0.593 0.12 [−0.31; 0.54]
Years of disorder 11.4 (8.78); 0.5–39 10.15 (8.35) 12.5 (9.09) −1.230 83 0.222 −0.27 [−0.69; 0.16]
Age at onset 25.6 (7.54); 13–46 27.29 (7.30) 24.04 (7.50) 2.032 83 0.045 0.44 [0.07; 0.93]
Number of hospitalizations 3.20 (3.98); 0–22 2.82 (3.26) 3.52 (4.51) −0.808 83 0.421 −0.18 [−0.6; 0,26]
Antipsychotic dosagea 28 (324); 0–2292 177.25 (171.15) 270.04 (408.6) −1.305 81 0.195 −0.29 [−0.71; 0.14]
Metacognition
BCIS self-reflectivity 14.7 (4.36); 4–27 14.49 (4.19) 14.96 (4.56) −0.487 82 0.627 −0.11 [−0.53; 0.32]
BCIS self-certainty 8.07 (3.32); 1–18 7.19 (2.54) 8.95 (3.79) −2.254 82 0.025 −0.54 [−0.97; −0.11]
Neurocognition
WAIS vocabulary subtest 106 (13.1); 70–140 110.83 (12.24) 102.5 (12.67) 3.196 83 0.002 0.69 [0.25; 1.13]
WAIS similarities subtest 11.86 (3.25); 2–19 12.82 (3.22) 11.07 (3.09) 2.553 82 0.013 0.55 [0.12; 0.99]
WCST perseverative errors 42.5 (8.11); 29–57 44.52 (8.26) 40.67 (7.82) 2.205 81 0.030 0.48 [0.05; 0.91]
WCST categories 3.82 (2.11); 0–6 4.42 (1.97) 3.24 (2.1) 2.613 81 0.011 0.57 [0.13; 1.00]
Symptomatology
PANSS excitative 5.19 (1.68); 4–11 4.83 (1.19) 5.52 (2.0) −2.024 83 0.054 −0.43 [−0.87; −0.01]
PANSS cognitive 4.98 (1.91); 3–10 4.59 (1.71) 5.3 (2.03) −1.735 83 0.086 −0.38 [−0.81; 0.05]
PANSS positive 7.39 (3.23); 4–16 6.77 (2.8) 7.91 (3.49) −1.645 83 0.104 −0.36 [−0.79; 0.07]
PANSS depressive 11.8 (4.31); 5–23 11.26 (3.98) 12.2 (4.56) −1.002 83 0.319 −0.22 [−0.64; 0.21]
PANSS expressive deficits 5.31 (2.64); 4–16 5.18 (2.02) 5.41 (3.08) −0.404 83 0.687 −0.09 [−0.51; 0.34]
PANSS experiential deficits 5.87 (3.21); 3–15 5.79 (3.05) 5.93 (3.38) −0.199 83 0.843 −0.04 [−0.47; 0.38]
aAntipsychotic drug doses are expressed as chlorpromazine equivalence; DIT, Dichotomous interpersonal thinking; Early psychosis, 5 or under 5 years of evolution of the disease;
PANSS, Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale; BCIS, Beck Cognitive Insight Scale; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; WAIS, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.
the data and explained between 14% (McFadden’s R2) and 24%
(Nagelkerke’s R2) of the variance, correctly classifying 67.9% of
the cases, with a sensitivity capacity of 0.716 and a specificity
of 0.641. As shown in Table 2, after the estimated cognitive
reserve was added and according to the p-values, an earlier age
at onset and a lower self-certainty in the model did not reach
statistical significance to explain their classification as the high
or low dichotomous interpersonal thinking groups. However,
according to the odds ratio (effect size), the strongest predictor
was self-certainty, followed by estimated cognitive reserve.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we tested differences in neurocognition and
metacognition in patients with psychosis. To this aim, we
compared individuals with high and low scores in dichotomous
thinking. Our results show that the group with high dichotomous
interpersonal thinking had poorer performance in self-certainty
and executive functioning. This group also had an earlier
age at onset, impaired abstract thinking, and lower estimated
cognitive reserve than the group with flexible thinking. Finally,
according to the logistic regression model, the factors that
differentiated between the two groups were estimated cognitive
reserve, followed by self-certainty.
Participants in the group with high interpersonal
dichotomous thinking were limited in their cognitive flexibility.
Also, their sense of self and perception of interpersonal
relationships was characterized by cognitive rigidity as
conceptualized from the neurocognitive (executive functioning)
and metacognitive (self-certainty) domains. Additionally, these
three constructs were measured using three different assessment
approaches: a semi-structured interview, the RGT (dichotomous
interpersonal thinking), a neuropsychological task (executive
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TABLE 2 | Hierarchical logistic regression models predicting level of dichotomous interpersonal thinking.















Step 1 113 0.028–0.052 3.19 (0.074)
Constant 1.69 (0.82) 4,248 0.857–21.05
Age at onset 3.619(0.074) −0.05 (0.03) 0,948 0.892–1.01
Step 2 110 0.066–0.12 4.84 (0.028) 8.03 (0.018)
Constant −0.05 (1.07) 0,947 0.115–7.77
Age at onset 2.03 (0.154) −0.04 (0.03) 0,957 0.899–1.02
Self-certainty 4.84 (0.028) 0.16 (0.08) 1,172 1,011–1.36
Step 3 104 0.14–0.24 8.05 (0.005) 16.08 (0.001)
Constant 6.31 (2.70) 554,031 4.39–221933.69
Age at onset 1.60 (0.206) −0.04 (0.03) 0,959 0.898–1.024
Self-certainty 2.72 (0.099) 0.12 (0.08) 1,134 0.972–1.321
Estimated cognitive reserve 8.05 (0.005) −0.06 (0.02) 0,944 0.904–0.988
Odds represents the ratio of “High level of dichotomous interpersonal thinking” vs. “Low level of dichotomous interpersonal thinking;” AIC, Arkaike Information Criteria; SE, Standard
error; CI, Confidence Interval.
functioning), and a self-reported questionnaire (self-certainty).
This convergence may support the idea that cognitive rigidity
may be a generalized cognitive disruption present in some
people with psychosis that manifests itself in specific domains
such as neurocognition, metacognition, and the view of self and
significant others. Patients in this group also showed earlier age
at onset, a finding that is congruent with extensive research,
suggesting that patients with earlier age at onset are more
impaired in executive functioning and general cognitive abilities
(51, 52). Our findings give further support to the idea that
earlier age at onset could be a surrogate of disorder severity
(53, 54), while high cognitive rigidity could be another marker of
this severity.
Despite these results, the logistic regression showed that the
domains that best differentiated patients with cognitive rigidity
from those who with a more flexible, less polarized thinking
pattern in the interpersonal context were the estimated cognitive
reserve and the self-certainty index of cognitive insight. Although
patients with high dichotomous interpersonal thinking had more
impaired executive functioning as measured with the WCST,
this measure did not contribute to explain the differences in the
logistic regression model, which was an unexpected result. This
result suggests that cognitive rigidity in the perception of self
and others may rely more on basic cognitive abilities connected
to cognitive reserve and on metacognitive processes related to
overconfidence and rigidity to consider alternative explanations,
rather than in specific abilities for flexibility in set-shifting. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to empirically support
this idea. It has been suggested that overconfidence in own
judgments may be influenced by acquired knowledge from past
experience (55), which aligns with our results. Indeed, the inner
construction of self and significant other is necessary built based
on basic cognition, previous experiences, and metacognitive
processes (22). It is not surprising that cognitive reserve emerged
as a determinant factor, as in light of recent findings, patients
with higher IQ are more likely to improve under metacognitive
interventions (56). These results also support a growing body of
evidence reporting that reasoning processes are underpinned by
general cognitive functions (10, 35).
In a previous analysis, we found a small but significant
association between high interpersonal rigidity andmore positive
symptoms (23). However, in the present study, we found that
the severity of positive symptomatology did not differ between
patients with higher and lower dichotomous interpersonal
thinking. This result also contrasts with many other studies
that related cognitive rigidity to increased positive symptoms
(57). It could be that cognitive rigidity may be a cognitive bias
related to but independent of the severity of positive symptoms,
which could be influenced by many factors, thus being a stable
trait of the disorder in a subgroup of patients. However, some
considerations regarding our sample characteristics may also be
considered. One explanation may be that we included patients
with different symptom profiles of the psychotic spectrum, and
the main literature in this topic has studied the presence of
cognitive rigidity in active-deluded patients (2, 32).
Our study has some limitations that might affect the
generalizability of the findings. First, the cross-sectional design
of the study prevents drawing conclusions about causality;
therefore, longitudinal studies are needed. Second, we conducted
a short screening of neurocognitive and cognitive insight
impairment. A more exhaustive assessment is needed to explore
the links between dichotomous interpersonal thinking and
comprehensive measures of cognitive biases and neurocognition.
For instance, it is unknown whether other neurocognitive factors
such as processing speed, working memory, or attention might
have an influence on these results, as these factors have been
shown to be affected in the presence of high self-certainty
(6). A measure of belief inflexibility when reasoning about
delusions should also be included in future studies to refine
the validity of the study presented in this paper (5). Moreover,
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the relationship with other relevant cognitive biases that may
share this underlying process of rigidity should be tested, such
as need for closure, bias against disconfirmatory evidence,
or jumping to conclusions (32, 58, 59). Third, regarding the
sample characteristics and despite its clinical and functional
heterogeneity, the proportion of chronic patients was much
bigger than the proportion of recent-onset patients. Future
studies with a focus on recent-onset patients would be needed.
Finally, due to the bimodal distribution of the dichotomous
interpersonal thinking index, we used the median split for
dividing the groups. This statistical method for establishing
groups has some advantages but has some drawbacks (48), so
there may be other more complex statistical approaches that
could yield different results. Different approaches to establishing
groups according to their level of cognitive rigidity should be
tested in future studies.
Despite the aforementioned limitations, our results may have
implications for research and clinical practice. Chief among them
is considering that cognitive rigidity may be a cognitive bias
more generalized than previously considered that affects not
only neurocognitive and metacognitive processes but also the
sense of self and identity. Cognitive rigidity would be present
in a subgroup of patients suffering psychosis. One possibility is
that this subgroup of patients may benefit from decreasing their
all-or-nothing tendency in their thinking pattern. To address
this issue, the therapeutic work may be better approached by
reducing the overconfidence in own judgments when thinking
about themselves and the others. However, this intervention
should always be adapted to the general intellectual level of
each individual.
If these cognitive process rely on previous acquired knowledge
and general cognitive abilities, they could be more amenable
to change by using personalized interventions that focus
on cognitive content (for example, cognitive-behavioral and
metacognitive interventions) (55) and adapted to their unique
interpersonal context. Alternatively, guaranteeing a minimum
level of general cognitive abilities before considering intervention
in cognitive rigidity may be recommended to maximize its
benefit (56). Summarizing, patients showing high interpersonal
dichotomous thinking might benefit from interventions that
target this cognitive bias on an integrative way and adapted to
their general level of intelligence. These suggestions should be
tested in clinical trials of cognitive behavioral and metacognitive
interventions in which changes in cognitive rigidity occur (31,
60, 61) or are expected to mediate the improvement in psychotic
symptomatology (10, 27).
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